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NOTE
WOMEN AS WARRIORS AFTER THE
GULF WAR: A CALL FOR THE REPEAL
OF ALL COMBAT EXCLUSION LAWS
The fight was inevitable. The gulf war and the 1989 Panama
invasion put servicewomen in the middle of the shooting and the
bleeding in a way no previous American war did. More than
35,000 women served in the gulf-and discovered that modern
warfare with its wide-ranging maneuver tactics and its long-
range weaponry has blurred the old boundaries between "front"
and "rear." Women worked in supply units, flew support air-
craft, crewed Patriot and Hawk missile units and served aboard
Navy tenders. These were not jobs with high combat probability.
But 11 women were killed and two taken prisoner. Maj. Marie T.
Rossi died when her chopper crashed while on a support mis-
sion. Army Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy fell into enemy
hands after accidentally driving into Iraqi positions in the de-
sert. Three women died when an Iraqi Scud missile struck their
billet near the end of the war. And so the argument: women al-
ready share the risks, let them fight equally alongside men. Let
women be warriors, too.1
Women denied opportunities in the military based' solely on
gender have long challenged the propriety of the combat exclusion
laws contained in title X of the United States Code2 and the com-
bat policies contained in Army regulations.3 Yet, despite mounting
' David H. Hackworth, War and the Second Sex, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, at 24.
2 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 6015, 8549 (West Supp. 1991) (excluding women from combat aircraft
and vessels). The aircraft bans were repealed on December 5, 1991. National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1290 (1991);
see also infra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing repeal and suspension of certain
combat exclusions).
I See, e.g., Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (challenging Army
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criticism, many combat exclusion laws and policies remain in force4
and continue to preclude women from attaining positions of high
esteem in the armed forces. Critics have urged Congress to repeal
these laws, contending that they violate the equality guarantees
embodied in the Fifth Amendment and in title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and that they frustrate significant military and
public policy objectives. 5
The appeals to Congress arose because the courts have tradi-
tionally demonstrated deference to the legislature in military mat-
ters.6 Courts have held title VII inapplicable to uniformed person-
nel of the armed forces and have rejected equal protection
challenges to military policy.' Although the United States Supreme
Court has never ruled on combat exclusion laws or policies, it has
addressed the constitutionality of excluding women from registra-
tion for the draft. In the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg,8 the
ban on title VII grounds); Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 294 (D.D.C. 1978) (challenging
Navy combat ban on equal protection grounds).
See ELLEN C. COLLIER, WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES 1-4 (Foreign Affairs & Nat'l
Defense Div., updated Sept. 24, 1991) (providing history of exclusions); see also 137 CONG.
REC. S12,401, S12,495-96 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (addressing repeal of aircraft combat ex-
clusion laws).
' See, e.g., MARTHA L. GOLAR, THE COMBAT ExCLUSION LAWS: AN IDEA WHOSE TixM HAS
GONE 52-56 (New York City Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Mil. Aff. & Just., Apr. 1, 1991) (support-
ing repeal by Congress); Kathy L. Snyder, Note, An Equal Right to Fight: An Analysis of
the Constitutionality of Laws and Policies that Exclude Women from Combat in the
United States Military, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 421, 445-48 (1991) (acknowledging courts' tradi-
tional deference to Congress in military realm and thus advocating congressional repeal);
Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in the Mili-
tary: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CAL. L. REV. 165, 186-91 (1990) (recognizing judicial in-
terpretation of title VII and need to amend it to apply explicitly to uniformed military).
8 See Snyder, supra note 5, at 445-48.
See, e.g., Spain v. Ball, 928 F.2d 61, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1991) (challenging Navy's age
policy on title VII and equal protection grounds); Roper v. Department of Army, 832 F.2d
247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987) (challenging Army's gender policy on title VII grounds); Johnson v.
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir.) (title VII challenge to Army's policy regarding
prior arrest record), cert. denied., 439 U.S. 986 (1978); see also Lewis v. United States
Army, 697 F. Supp. 1385, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (deferential review of Army's policy of per-
mitting male high school drop-outs to enlist while excluding female drop-outs).
8 453 U.S. 57 (1981). In Rostker, the male petitioners challenged a provision in the
Military Selective Service Act ("MSSA") that authorized the president to require that men
but not women be registered for military service. Id. at 61. They asserted, inter alia, that the
statute violated their equal protection rights. Id. at 61 n.2.
As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter decided in
1980 that it was necessary to begin the registration process. Id. at 60. The President sought
congressional allocation of funds for registration and also requested that the MSSA be
amended to permit the registration of women. Id. Congress chose not to amend the MSSA
and allocated just enough funds for the registration of men. Id. at 61. On remand from the
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Court upheld the male-only registration system, emphasizing that
the judiciary lacks the competence to regulate military affairs.,
Recently, however, Congress responded to criticism of combat
exclusion laws by passing the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 which repealed title X bans against
women flying combat missions for the Air Force, Navy, and
Marines. 10 However, the repeal does not affect the ban against
Third Circuit, the district court, applying the "middle scrutiny" test, found the MSSA vio-
lative of equal protection and enjoined registration. Id. at 63. The next day, the Director of
Selective Service filed a notice of appeal to the Third Circuit; shortly thereafter Justice
Brennan stayed the district court's order, and selective service registration commenced. Id.
at 64.
In reviewing the MSSA, the United States Supreme Court demonstrated great defer-
ence to Congress, citing the legislature's authority to raise and support armies. Id. at 70-71
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14).
Id. at 65-66. The majority did, however, distinguish the MSSA from other gender-
based discrimination cases, noting that the MSSA was thoroughly considered by Congress
before enactment and was not merely a product of traditional thinking about the roles of
women. Id. at 72. However, while the justices implied that they would closely scrutinize
gender-based legislation absent evidence of detailed consideration by Congress, the majority
actually cited the combat exclusion laws to justify the all-male registration. Id. at 76-77.
10 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-190, 105 Stat. 1290 (1991); see also Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Com-
pensation Subcommittee House Armed Services Committee "Women in the Military,"
102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992); COLLIER, supra note 4, at 1, 12-13 (discussing passage of
Defense Authorization bill by House and Senate). The House and Senate passed the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, see Dewar, infra note 11,
at Al, and President Bush signed the bill on December 5, 1991, id.
The primary factors motivating passage of the legislation were the desires to repeal
anachronistic legislation, to improve the nation's defense, and to grant women equal oppor-
tunity. See 137 CONG. REc. S11,412, S11,416 (daily ed. July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). Excerpts from the debates in Congress concerning the repeal read as follows:
Barriers based on sex discrimination are coming down in every part of our
society. The Armed Forces should be no exception. Women should be allowed to
play a full role in our national defense, free of any arbitrary and discriminatory
restrictions. The only fair and proper test of a women's [sic] role is not gender but
ability to do the job.
... The changing nature of modern warfare means that old distinctions are
obsolete.
The dangers now extend well behind the lines. As we saw in the Persian Gulf
war, military personnel well behind the lines can be killed or wounded....
In the gulf war, the technological abilities of our personnel were as important
to our victory as their physical strength and courage. There is virtually universal
consensus that the women who served in Operation Desert Storm did an outstand-
ing job, including jobs that were, for all practical purposes, combat jobs....
... The fact is, women already meet the very demanding standards to fly high
performance combat aircraft. They test combat aircraft. They train combat pilots.
Id. Later in the debates, Senator Kennedy noted that the Secretary of Defense supported
19921
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women in combat vessels and the many restrictions contained in
Army regulations.1 Although the limited repeal is clearly a step in
the right direction, the fact remains that under current regulations,
many qualified women may never be permitted to serve in combat
positions.12 In the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress
established a commission to study all matters relating to assign-
ments of women in the military.' 3 It is hoped that the commis-
the repeal of the combat exclusions, especially in light of women's performance during the
Persian Gulf War. Id. at S11,423.
Senator Roth also indicated some of his reasons for supporting the repeal:
The readiness and preparedness of our military defense is a serious matter.
When our Nation's future is at stake-and the future of free nations is at
stake-we want the most skilled and seasoned men and women on the job.
Make no mistake-military excellence must be our first priority. Our Secre-
tary of Defense must have the greatest flexibility and maneuverability to marshall
the forces at his command. We want the best and brightest pilots in the air, not
on the ground. We want the best person in the cockpit of a Stealth fighter or B-1
bomber-not the second best.
Mr. President, America is with us on this issue. A Newsweek poll released just
this week shows that 63 percent of Americans favor allowing women to fly combat
aircraft. The American people know what is good for our military defense is also
good for the country. And what is good for the country is excellence, readiness,
preparedness, strength, and flexibility.
For anyone who thinks we need more studies, more evidence, I say, look at
the record. Women have been pulling G's in high performance aircraft for over 15
years now. Women aviators train our male combat pilots. They test the newest
generation aircraft. They fly the space shuttle. Women pilots test FA-18's and C-
27's, they fly transport planes and refueling planes, they fly AWACS and helicop-
ters. In fact, women have flown just about every plane that the Pentagon has built
in the past three decades. There is no question about their performance, or their
experience, in this regard.
Id. at S11,413-14 (statement of Sen. Roth). But see id. at S11,420 (Senator McCain quoting
negative attitudes of some high-level military officials). The only substantive objection was
that the repeal might result in a draft of women. See id. at S11,420. However, a number of
senators harbored minor concerns and were thus enthusiastic about creating a commission
to study the matter. See id. at S11,417-18.
" Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Women in Combat, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1991, at Al,
A7 (Senate voted to allow women to fly combat missions and authorized suspension of sex-
based restrictions for land and sea combat roles while presidential commission studies issue
of women's military assignments).
2 See COLLIER, supra note 4, at 8. The author states, "[r]epeal of the combat exclusion
provisions would not necessarily result in assignments of women to all combat units because
it would be up to each service Secretary to set policy and assign personnel." Id.
'3 See 137 CONG. REc. S12,548-601 (dally ed. Aug. 15, 1991). The Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Services Act of 1991 was created to study all matters
concerning the assignments of women in the armed forces. Id. Investigating the impact on
the armed forces of permitting women to serve in combat roles was a priority for the Com-
mission. Id. Although this appears to be a positive development, some critics of the combat
exclusion laws opposed the formation of the commission. See Patricia Ireland, Statement of
WOMEN AS WARRIORS
sion's findings will result in the expansion of women into combat
roles so that qualified women can receive the opportunities they
deserve.
This Note examines combat exclusion laws and policies and
concludes that they violate the Fifth Amendment and prevent the
realization of important social objectives. Part I describes women's
roles in the military prior to the adoption of combat exclusion laws
and provides the legislative history of the exclusions. Part II ar-
gues that although the laws and policies do not violate title VII,
they do contravene equal protection guarantees. Finally, part III
explores the policy reasons for repealing combat exclusions and
urges that qualified women be permitted to hold combat positions.
I. WOMEN'S ROLES IN THE MILITARY AND THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF COMBAT EXCLUSION LAWS
Women have served crucial roles in the armed forces since at
least the fourteenth century, and the extent of their involvement
in combat has increased through time.14 In early European armies,
women held important military support roles.'" Furthermore, as
far back as the seventeenth century, women at times engaged in
battle' s6 and sometimes even disguised themselves as men in order
to participate in the fighting effort.' 7
In this country, women served in militia units during the Rev-
olutionary War 8 and were acknowledged for their fighting efforts
during the Civil War. 9 Nonetheless, with the exception of the
Nursing Corps, American women were not officially recruited for
positions in the armed forces until World War 1.2o
NOW Executive Vice President Patricia Ireland Supporting Repeal of Combat Exclusion
Laws for Women (July 25, 1991) (news release). The commission is supposed to report its
findings to Congress by November 15, 1992. See COLLIER, supra note 4, at 13.
14 Marilyn A. Gordon & Mary J. Ludvigson, The Combat Exclusion for Women Avia-
tors: A Constitutional Analysis, 1 USAFA J. OF LEGAL STUD. 51, 51-53 (1990).
15 Id. at 51.
,6 Barton C. Hacker, Women and Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe: A
Reconnaissance, 64 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 643, 658 (1981).
17 Gordon & Ludvigson, supra note 14, at 52.
18 JUNE A. WILLENZ, WOMEN VETERANS: AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN HEROINS 10-11 (1983).
From the meager records of military life prior to the 1800s, it is difficult to establish the
extent of women's involvement in combat roles. Id. at 10. However, there are numerous
accounts of women injuring and killing the enemy, including stories of legendary figures who
disguised themselves as men and fought with the troops. Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 12.
20 Id. at 15; see also JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLU-
1992]
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In World War II, women in Russia, China, Italy, France, and
other countries were employed in combat roles.2' In contrast,
American women, although active in 'all branches of the armed ser-
vices, and despite being called upon to train male pilots, were not
officially assigned to combat roles.22 However, the participation of
women in World War II eliminated all doubt regarding their effec-
tiveness in times of national crisis23 and prompted a movement in
the United States to permanently integrate women into the armed
services.
At the end of World War II, the military concluded that pro-
viding formal military roles for women would be in the nation's
best interest.24 Accordingly, Congress enacted the Women's Armed
Services Integration Act of 1948, thereby granting women perma-
nent status in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. 2
However, the Act in its final form contained numerous restrictions,
most notably a prohibition against women in combat. The Air
Force combat ban, for example, provides that "[f]emale members
of the Air Force, except those designated under section 8067 of this
title, or appointed with a view to designation under that section,
may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat
missions. ' 's
6
TION 10 (1982) (author is retired Major General of Air Force). Women became reservists in
the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard during World War I. Id.
"2 See Gordon & Ludvigson, supra note 14, at 53; see also HELEN ROGAN, MIXED COM-
PANY: WOMEN IN THE MODERN ARMY 85-87 (1981).
"2 See HOLM, supra note 20, at 18-29. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, Women's
Auxiliary Corps, Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service, Semper Paratus-Al-
ways Ready, Women's Air Force Service Pilots, Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron, and
Women's Flying Training Detachment units, consisting of thousands of women, were formed
at various points during World War II. See id.
22 See ROXINE C. HART, WOMEN IN COMBAT 8 (Research Div., Defense Equal Opportu-
nity Mgmt. Inst., 1991). In addressing the performance of American women, Hart's report
states,
All told, the women's record was impressive.... Most of their work was tedious,
and in many cases, the conditions were deplorable. Still, despite the demoralizing
situations and attitudes, the women remained committed to the value of their
work. Their attrition levels were the same or lower than the men's. They were not
as prone to get drunk, go AWOL (Absent Without Leave), or violate Articles of
War. They were never considered a discipline problem.
Id.
24 See Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat.
356 (1949).
22 See id. "The primary purpose was to provide a means of mobilizing women in the
event of general war." HART, supra note 23, at 9.
28 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1991). The Navy exclusion (reflecting the 1978 amendment), which
[Vol. 66:829
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:829
tive Vinson failed to provide any substantive support for his views,
members of the House who opposed combat exclusion laws were
unable to muster the votes required to prevent their incorporation
into the bill.30 When the bill was returned to the Senate, objections
to the exclusion amendment caused the bill to be sent to a confer-
ence committee; however, the Senate later accepted the bill with-
out debate. 1
It appears that those who advocated the combat exclusions
did so because of their stereotypical views of women's roles in soci-
ety.3 2 This is evidenced by the absence in the congressional discus-
sions of any particular military purpose for the exclusions. 3 Thus,
although no sound basis exists for restricting women to noncombat
roles in the military, until recently, nearly forty percent of all
armed forces positions were open only to men.3 4
II. TITLE VII AND EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENTS AGAINST
COMBAT EXCLUSIONS
A. Title VII
Laws and policies pertaining to the uniformed military have
been challenged on title VII grounds without success.3 5 Title VII of
ship is the proper place for them to serve. Let them serve on shore in the Conti-
nental United States and outside of the United States, but keep them off the
ships. Of course, they ought to serve on hospital ships.
Mr. SHAFER. Without objection, the amendment-
Mr. BISHOP. No; I object to it. I want them to go to sea and get equal rights. I
talked to some of them and they do not want to be deprived of equal rights.
Mr. VINSON. We will vote on it when we get a quorum .....
Mr. VINSON. Let us go one step further: Why should they be assigned to any
kind of aeronautical duty that pertains to flights?
Captain HANCOCK. Mr. Vinson, women in the aviation specialties are perform-
ing duties of the ratings in which they are serving that do require flights in air-
craft on the same basis it is required for men serving in those same ratings....
Id. at 5689-90, 5712.
30 See id. at 5711-13; see also Gordon & Ludvigson, supra note 14, at 61-62.
31 See Gordon & Ludvigson, supra note 14, at 62.
82 See id. at 63.
33 Id. at 64.
34 CAROLYN BECRAFT, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 2 (Women's Research & Educ. Inst.,
1990) [hereinafter BECRAFT, MILITARY]. The percentage of positions available to women in
each of the forces are 52% in the Army, 59% in the Navy, 20% in the Marine Corps, 97% in
the Air Force, and 100% in the Coast Guard. CAROLYN BECRAFT, WOMEN IN THE U.S. ARMED
SERVICES: THE WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF 1-3 (Women's Research & Educ. Inst., 1991) [here-
inafter BECRAFT, PERSIAN GULF].
85 See Gonzalez v. Department of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983). The court
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Ironically, although this legislation placed a major limitation
on our armed forces, it was enacted by Congress without much de-
liberation or justification and against the express judgment of the
military. 7 The original Senate bill did not contain combat exclu-
sions, and few references were made to women in combat in the
Senate Armed Services Committee hearings.2 8 However, through
the efforts of the outspoken and persevering Representative Carl
Vinson, the combat exclusions were added to the original Senate
bill during a House subcommittee meeting. 29 Although Representa-
also applies to the Marines, provides the following:
The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women officers,
women warrant officers, and enlisted women members of the Regular Navy and
the Regular Marine Corps shall be trained and qualified for military duty ....
However, women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are
engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to other than temporary
duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a
similar classification not expected to be assigned combat missions.
10 U.S.C.A. § 6015 (West Supp. 1991).
27 See Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 309 (D.D.C. 1978) ("[W]hen Congress carved
out the disputed exception to the Navy's ability to use women aboard Navy vessels, it acted
without serious deliberation, against the expressed judgment of the military .... ").
18 Hearings on Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1947, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-9 (1947). The primary issue considered was whether women should be given permanent
and regular status in the armed forces. See id.
29 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Organization and Mobilization of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5689-5713 (1948). Excerpts of the dialogue
between Representative Vinson, the sponsor of the combat exclusion laws, and other repre-
sentatives follow:
Mr. VINSON. Is there anything in this bill that excludes any assignment for sea
duty, that prohibits you from assigning a WAVE officer or an enlisted WAVE to
sea duty?
Captain STICKNEY. No, sir.
Mr. VINSON. Do you think it would be quite helpful to the bill to write into the
law that they cannot be ordered to sea duty? ...
Captain STICKNEY. Yes, sir. We do not feel, though, that it was necessary to
write that into law, Mr. Vinson.
Mr. VINSON. Well, I think it is a good matter. I think the Congress should take a
positive stand on it and not leave it to the discretion of the Secretary. From your
remark just a while ago, you said they might be used in communications and rec-
reation work on ships-
Mr. VINSON. I propose an amendment, if somebody will draft it. I am just throw-
ing it out for what it is worth. Those are my views. I think it will strengthen the
bill to have it positively understood by Congress that ships are not places to which
these women are going to be detailed and nobody has any authority to detail them
to serve on ships.
Of course, they are not going to be detailed to serve on ships, but you cannot
tell what happens, you know, because somebody might say they need a few of
them up there to do communications or other kinds of work and I do not think a
1992]
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be an effective weapon to combat
employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or
national origin3" because it can be invoked to terminate a practice
that cannot be stricken on constitutional grounds.37 However, be-
cause the Act could interfere with military efficiency, the courts
construe it narrowly when internal military functions are impli-
cated.38 Because neither the language of title VII nor its legislative
history indicates that it was meant to apply to the uniformed mili-
focused on indications of a congressional intent to exempt the uniformed military personnel
from the relevant section of title VII. Id. (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(a)(1964)); see also Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir.) ("[I]f
Congress had intended for the statute to apply to the uniformed personnel of the various
armed services it would have said so in unmistakable terms."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986
(1978). But see Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1238 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("There is noth-
ing in Title VII to suggest that the uniformed military are an exception to 'members of
military departments' expressly covered under § 2000e-16.").
Writing for the Hill court, Chief Judge Weinstein concluded that the legislative history
was ambiguous. Id. at 1236. The court was most persuaded by the language in title X which
"seems to lump civilian and military components into the term [military] department." Id.
The court also noted that membership in the armed forces is now viewed as a form of em-
ployment and thus deserves title VII protection. See id.
Subsequently, however, the Second Circuit, disagreed with Chief Judge Weinstein's
analysis and essentially overruled Hill. See Roper v. Department of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248
(2d Cir. 1987). The court stated that title VII should not be extended to uniformed mem-
bers of the armed forces because "[mlilitary service continues to differ materially from civil-
ian employment in that officers and personnel are subject to military law and unable to
terminate such employment at will." Id. (citing Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1233
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978)). The court added that "[t]he relationship be-
tween the government and a uniformed member of the military remains unlike the relation-
ship which exists between civilian employer and employee." Id.
6 Title VII provides, in part, the following:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
'7 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 325 (1977) (title VII claimant need only
show discriminatory impact). Moreover, unlike the equal protection clause, title VII applies
to some private employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
3s See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Webb, 839 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1988) (examining Mindes
v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971), which held that courts should not review
internal military matters). The Bledsoe court distinguished between civilian and uniformed
employees of military departments and held that decisions pertaining to the former, but not
to the latter, are justiciable. Id.
The Supreme Court has not yet construed title VII in the military context. However,
the Court has interpreted it broadly in other contexts. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976).
1992]
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tary, 9 it is submitted that the circuit courts confronted with the
question were correct in concluding that uniformed military are
not covered by title VII.40
B. Equal Protection
In the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren,4' the Supreme Court de-
vised the now universally applied "middle scrutiny" standard for
determining the constitutionality of gender-based classifications.42
The middle scrutiny test falls somewhere between "strict scru-
tiny," which is applied to classifications based on race and ethnic-
ity, and the "rational basis" test, which is applied to most other
39 See Roper, 832 F.2d at 247-48. The court focused on Congress's use of the phrase
"military departments," instead of "armed forces," in the section of title VII that extended
the Act to the military sector and reasoned that the term "military departments" indicated
congressional intent to include only civilian employees, not enlisted personnel. Id. at 248;
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1988). The court also examined the legislative history and
noted that there was no evidence that Congress desired to have the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, responsible for enforcing title VII, review the employment prac-
tices of the armed forces. See Roper, 832 F.2d at 247.
40 See Roper, 832 F.2d at 248; see also Spain v. Ball, 928 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1991)
(applicant for military service unsuccessfully challenged Navy's age discrimination); Doe v.
Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1461 (11th Cir. 1990) (HIV-infected naval reserve member unsuc-
cessfully challenged his release), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1102 (1991); Gonzalez v. Depart-
ment of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1983) (title VII held inapplicable to army
Major's charge of racial discrimination); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (8th
Cir.) (unsuccessful racial discrimination challenge by prospective uniformed member of
army), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978).
The Tenth Circuit held that commissioned officers of the Public Health Service
("PHS") are exempt from title VII. See Salazar v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 527, 530-31 (10th Cir.
1986). But see Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (commissioned officers
not exempt from title VII). The Milbert court in reaching its decision assumed that mem-
bers of the armed forces were exempt and distinguished between commissioned officers of
the PHS and members of the armed forces. Id.
Thus far, only a district court has held title VII applicable to the uniformed military.
See Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1237-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). Chief Judge Weinstein
acknowledged that case law pointed to the contrary, but believed that the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of title VII were ambiguous. See id. at 1233-38. Nevertheless,
petitioner Hill ultimately did not obtain judicial relief because the court held that "being
male is a bona fide occupational qualification for a job that is by federal law and present
national policy restricted to men." Id. at 1243. Although the opinion of the Hill court re-
flects a great deal of analysis, the premise on which it is based, that title VII applies unless
its language clearly indicates that it does not, is questionable.
41 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
See G. Sidney Buchanan, Women in Combat: An Essay On Ultimate Rights and
Responsibilities, 28 Hous. L. REv. 503, 504 (1991) ("In the period since 1976, the Court, in
determining the validity of gender classifications, has regularly employed the Craig test as a
term of art with only slight, and probably insignificant, variations in language.").
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classifications.43 Under the "middle scrutiny" test, those in support
of a gender-based law or policy must show that it is substantially
related to a significant governmental objective." The case of Orr v.
Orr,4 5 involving a state law under which wives could not be ordered
to pay alimony upon divorce, provides one example of a statute
that failed to withstand middle scrutiny. Declaring the law uncon-
stitutional, the Orr Court observed that "[1]egislative classifica-
tions which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender
carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper
place' of women and their need for special protection. 4
Middle scrutiny was applied to a combat exclusion law in
1978, and the statute was held to be unconstitutionally overbroad.
Owens v. Brown47 involved a class action challenge to the Navy's
rule that women could not be assigned to duty on "vessels of the
Navy other than hospital ships and transports.."48 Determining
that the law was based on gender stereotypes rather than on mili-
tary objectives, the court concluded that the exclusion was not
substantially related to a significant governmental interest.49 The
" See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Although the Craig Court was not the first to recognize
that a standard stricter than the rational basis test was appropriate for gender-based classi-
fications, it was the first to articulate the new standard. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (indicating that the inherently suspect nature of sex discrimination
subjects it to "close judicial scrutiny"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (purporting to
apply "rational basis" standard, but actually employing higher standard).
" See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
45 440 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1979).
46 Id. at 283.
" 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
48 Id. at 294 n.1.
49 See id. at 307. Judge Sirica, writing for the court, said, "[T]o the extent that it repre-
sents a generalization about women that even the highest defense authorities concede is
unsound, it is not 'substantially related to the achievement of ... [important governmen-
tal] objectives.'" Id. at 299 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Before articu-
lating the holding of the case, Judge Sirica provided backgrounds of some of the women
challenging the combat law, emphasizing how much each woman's military advancement
was stifled solely because of her gender. See id. at 295-96. He provided the following back-
ground of a female lieutenant commander:
Plaintiff Kathleen Byerly is a naval officer with approximately twelve years of
experience. Ranked as a lieutenant commander, and recognized by the Navy as a
distinguished officer, she holds the position of Aide and Flag Secretary to the
Commander Training Command in the Pacific Fleet... [b]ut unlike male officers
with comparable backgrounds and experience, she is precluded by section 6015's
absolute prohibition from advancing to the prized position of shipboard command.
This is solely because the command of a vessel necessarily involves an assignment
at sea and because plaintiff Byerly is a female.
Id. at 296.
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exclusion was then modified, resulting in an expansion of women's
opportunities to serve on naval ships.5 0 However, the Navy and the
other branches of the military continue to restrict women's roles.
Thus the prospects for women's advancement in the armed forces
remain severely limited.
In upholding the male-only registration law in Rostker v.
Goldberg,5s the Supreme Court demonstrated great deference to
Congress in the area of military legislation.52 Consequently, the ex-
The argument that the exclusions protect women from the perils of war, for example,
has been discredited by military experts who point out that no distinct front line exists on
the modern battlefield. See OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE PATRICIA SCHROEDER, HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES, FACT SHEET WOMEN IN COMBAT 2 (101st Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 20, 1990). Rep-
resentative Schroeder has asserted that although
the Army evaluates the jobs they open to women in terms of their theoretical
proximity to the battlefield[,] ... the realities of modern warfare, whether missiles
or guerilla tactics, make it difficult to define a field of battle. Military personnel,
regardless of their position, are likely to be exposed to danger.... While women
are barred from assignment to the jobs that are most likely to face direct combat,
they are assigned to support and service support positions that bring them into
the battlefield on a regular basis.
Snyder, supra note 5, at 430 (citing Experimental Program for Women in Army Combat
Units: Hearings on H.R. 3868 Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Com-
pensation of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990)).
Because women provide battle group support, arguably, it is even more likely that they
will be exposed to danger than if they were on the front line. "This is because contemporary
battle doctrine ... now calls first for striking supply lines in the rear of the battle area in
order to destroy the logistical base of the opposing force and thereby cripple the combat
arm of the force." GOLAR, supra note 5, at 24.
"o See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also HART, supra note 23, at 13
("amendment ... allowed the navy to assign women aboard combat ships for a period not to
exceed 180 days"); GOLAR, supra note 5, at 11-12 ("[T]his change still left the core of the
Navy, the combat fleet, with no women.").
The Department of Defense draft of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
("DOPMA") would have totally repealed the combat exclusions in 10 U.S.C. §§ 6015, 8549
in 1973; however, to expedite the passage of the DOPMA, the portion about repealing com-
bat exclusions was eliminated. GOLAR, supra note 5, at 12. In return, Congress asked the
Secretary of Defense and the services to clarify the word "combat," which they did in 1978.
Id. at 13. In 1979 the Defense Department again proposed repeal of the exclusions, but no
decision was made with regard to this matter. Id.
-1 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (6-3 decision). Courts have tended to dispose of equal protection
issues by consigning the matters involved to the realm of internal military affairs until thor-
oughly exhausting those avenues. See Hodges v. Callaway, 449 F.2d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 1974).
"The army should be afforded every opportunity to interpret and apply its own regulations.
Exhaustion is required." Id. But see Vance v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 826, 832 (N.D.
Tex.) (exhaustion not required in "purely legal" claim over which military possesses no spe-
cial knowledge), af'd, 565 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1977).
"2 See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 60-61. In contrast, when the Owens court was confronted
with the question of whether the combat exclusion issue was justiciable, it responded as
follows:
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clusion laws have been considered military matters and the courts
have been reluctant to intervene.5 3 However, it is suggested that
critical distinctions between the Military Selective Service Act
("MSSA") in Rostker and the combat exclusion laws dictate that
less deferential treatment be accorded the latter. Specifically, un-
like the combat exclusion laws, the MSSA received national atten-
tion and was enacted following lengthy deliberation by Congress. 5 4
Notwithstanding Rostker, some of the current Supreme Court Jus-
tices are not inclined to defer to Congress on constitutional mat-
Whether the deference due particular military determinations rises to the level of
occasioning nonreviewability is a question that varies from case to case and turns
on the degree to which the specific determinations are laden with discretion and
the likelihood that judicial resolution will involve the courts in an inappropriate
degree of supervision over primary military activities.
Owens, 455 F. Supp. at 300. The court then cited a number of other circuits that reviewed
military actions to make certain they were constitutional. See id. at 301.
" See Snyder, supra note 5, at 429. "Rostker provides an impediment to a challenge on
the constitutionality of statutes and policies restricting women from combat." Id. Most
courts have viewed Rostker as mandating a laissez faire attitude toward military policy.
See, e.g., Watson v. Arkansas Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1010 (8th Cir. 1989) (discharged
National Guard member unsuccessfully sought correction of records and reinstatement);
Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538, 1545-47 (10th Cir. 1986) (discharged Army private un-
successfully sought jury trial). Others have not completely disregarded these cases, but
opted instead for a moderate position by balancing the parties assertions giving due weight
to the competing interests. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1536 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (captain in Air Force unsuccessfully challenged regulation preventing him from
wearing yarmulke), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
In Goldman, an orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi challenged, on First Amendment
grounds, an Air Force regulation that prevented him from wearing his yarmulke while he
was in uniform. Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1535. Petitioner Goldman urged the court to use the
standard employed in other First Amendment cases, the "strict scrutiny" test. Id. The court
declined to use the strict test, showing great deference for the military legislation. Id. at
1536. Writing for the court, Senior Circuit Judge Swygert said, "The Supreme Court dis-
cussed a similar dispute concerning the appropriate level of scrutiny of a sex-based classifi-
cation in the military context in Rostker v. Goldberg.... It rejected suggestions that consid-
eration of the weighty interests on each side be used to refine the test under which the
classification should be judged." Id.
"I See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70-71. In justifying the deference accorded Congress in the
review of MSSA, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated,
This case is quite different from several of the gender-based discrimination cases
we have considered in that, despite appellees' assertions, Congress did not act 'un-
thinkingly' or 'reflexively and not for any considered reason'. . . . The question of
registering women for the draft not only received considerable national attention
and was the subject of wide-ranging public debate, but also was extensively con-
sidered by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee. Hearings held by
both Houses of Congress in response to the President's request for authorization
to register women adduced extensive testimony and evidence concerning the issue.
Id. at 72.
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ters, regardless of the consideration given to a particular law. 5
If the courts scrutinize existing combat exclusion laws, it is
submitted that the laws will be deemed unconstitutional for lack-
ing a substantial relation to any important governmental objective.
Presumably, the exclusion laws and policies were intended to in-
crease military effectiveness; virtually no one in the military con-
tends that permitting women in many of the combat positions
would decrease efficiency.56 Instead, it appears that such a change
could actually increase effectiveness by expanding the pool of qual-
ified candidates for'military duty.57
The absence of a relationship between the combat exclusions
and military efficiency is vividly illustrated by an examination of
the positions classified as "combat." Each of the services has been
charged with formulating criteria for labeling a position "combat,"
and each has developed its own elastic standard. 8 Many of the
"combat" positions, unavailable to women, are unlikely to involve
any exposure to battle conditions.5 An extreme example is the
11 See Carden v. Arkoma Ass'n, 494 U.S. 185, 198 (1990) (Court decided constitutional
issue independently); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (courts must
remain ultimate interpreters of constitution). The current Supreme Court appears to have
adopted a zero-based jurisprudence and is, therefore, unlikely to defer to anyone. See Linda
Greenhouse, Court Serves Notice of Its Transformation, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 2, 1992, at E3.
"' See Snyder, supra note 5, at 431. "The government would be able to satisfy the first
step of the Craig test by arguing that the maintenance of an effective national defense is an
important governmental objective. But [it] could not meet the second step... because the
exclusion of women from combat is not substantially related to maintaining an effective
military force." Id.; see also Note, Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality of All-
Male Registration, 94 HARV. L. REV. 406, 411 (1980) ("Nearly unanimous opinion within the
military establishment confirms that the participation of women contributes to, rather than
detracts from, military effectiveness.").
57 See GOLAR, supra note 5, at 22. The author states,
Demographically, the pool of males eligible for military service has been shrinking
from a 1978 level of 2.13 million men reaching the age of 18, to a predicted 1992
level of 1.61 million, with no rise expected until the turn of the century. As for the
quality of personnel, in 1980 more than 25% of all new male recruits and almost
50% of the Army's male recruits had abilities "below average." Further, during
the 1980's many top male technicians were recruited away from the services to
lucrative jobs in the private sector ... [t]hus, the availability of a sufficient num-
ber of qualified males is not assured.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
58 See id. at 16. "Both the interpretation and the definitions have changed over time.
Generally these changes have been the subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle efforts of the
various branches to skirt the restrictions imposed on women's roles in combat and to move
women into more combat-related positions." Id.
59 Snyder, supra note 5, at 444. "The combat exclusion laws even close off job opportu-
nities to women that do not involve combat." Id. Such occupations as "'plumber" and "inte-
rior electrician" have been deemed "combat" positions. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of
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Army's ban on female biochemists because of the position's classi-
fication of biochemist as a "combat support role. 6 0
III. POLICY REASONS FOR PERMITTING WOMEN TO ASSUME
COMBAT ROLES
While it is obvious that combat exclusions inhibit the progress
of women in the armed services, it is submitted that they also re-
sult in a weaker military and may contribute to discrimination
against women in our society. Currently, women comprise about
eleven percent of the armed forces.6 1 However, because women are
denied the opportunity to achieve the highest military positions,
the most able are not likely to pursue military careers.6 2 Conse-
quently, the pool of candidates qualified for military service is re-
duced, and this nation's military effectiveness is impaired.63 Fur-
thermore, because of the widespread belief that the military is
"central to the entire social order,"6 4 any discrimination against
women in the military may result in subordination, stigmatization,
and harassment of women in all walks of life. 5
It is submitted that the costs attributable to the exclusion
laws are without any substantial justification. With the advanced
technology employed by the military,6 physical strength has be-
come less important and technical skills and hand-eye coordination
have become more important attributes for success in combat
Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 531 (1991).
However, the inconsistencies among branches resulting from varying definitions probably
have been limited as a consequence of the Department of Defense's adoption of a standard
interpretation (DOD Risk Rule) of the combat exclusion laws in 1988. See U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, 8 MILITARY WOMEN IN THE DEP'T OF DEFENSE V (1990).
"1 See Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). Plaintiff Joan Hill
enlisted in the Army on the understanding that she would become a chemical specialist. Id.
After she enlisted, the army informed her that the position had been reclassified as a "com-
bat support role" and was thus unavailable to her pursuant to the combat exclusion policies.
Id. Ms. Hill was honorably discharged, but encountered difficulty obtaining employment
elsewhere because her discharge papers were delayed for almost a year. Id. It is interesting
to note that the position was later reclassified as "non-combat." See id.
6 COLLIER, supra note 4, at 9.
62 See Sacramento Bee, On Women At War... Lift the Combat Ban, L.A. DAILY JOUR-
NAL, Aug. 7, 1991, at 6 (editorial).
63 See supra note 57.
" CYNTHIA ENLOE, DOES KHAKI BECOME You? THE MILITARIZATION OF WOMEN'S LIvEs
17 (1983).
" See Rogers, supra note 5, at 167. "In a larger perspective, the prevalence of sex-
based roles in the military propagates discrimination throughout society." Id.
6 See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR 235-320 (1989).
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:829
roles.6 7 Thus, women who can pass the appropriate tests6 8 should
be deemed qualified for combat positions. 9 Advocates of combat
exclusions assert that military men will find the presence of women
in their combat units distracting and that "male bonding" will be
destroyed.7 0 However, this argument ignores the recent positive ex-
perience of sex-integration in other workplaces such as the police
force.7 1 As more women enter the workplace, "their presence be-
comes less and less remarkable" and their status evolves from "or-
naments to tokens to valued co-workers. '72 The assumption that a
law or practice should remain intact merely because people refuse
to adjust their attitudes and expectations has been rejected 73 and
is indeed dangerous.
In recent years, several countries, most notably Canada, have
considered the issues surrounding the exclusion of women from
V See GOLAR, supra note 5, at 34; see also Karst, supra note 59, at 532.
Most combat jobs do not require physical strength at a level that will exclude
large numbers of women.... [t]he lighter rifle is only a minor example of a much
larger development in combat technology: as time goes on, combat, .. . relies less
and less on muscle power, more and more on firepower.
Id.
68 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (woman challenged height
and weight criteria for position of prison guard on title VII grounds). Dothard held that
physical requirements that are not truly job-related may not be used as a basis for excluding
women from positions for which they are otherwise qualified. Id. at 331.
6" See HART, supra note 23, at 17. On the average, women are well-qualified for these
roles. See THE REGISTRATION AND DRAFTING OF WOMEN IN 1980 3-4 (Nat'l Org. for Women
Position Paper, Wash., D.C., 1980) (tests show women perform as well as men in combat
roles). Women entering the service generally have higher educational levels than men.
BECRAFT, MILITARY, supra note 34, at 2. Because of the advanced technology used in mili-
tary weapon systems, education is becoming an increasingly important factor in determining
who qualifies for the service. COLLIER, supra note 4, at 5.
Although men have scored higher than women in electronics, general mechanics, and
motor mechanics on army aptitude tests, these differences are to be expected because of the
educational and cultural differences between men and women. Id. Proper training has been
shown to reduce this gap; therefore, such test results are not indicative of properly trained
women. Id.
71 Karst, supra note 59, at 536-37. The author notes that society is also concerned
about protecting women. Id. at 536. However, "women casualties on civilian police forces or
the publicized deaths of women astronauts have not brought cries of outrage from the pub-
lic." HART, supra note 23, at 20.
7 Karst, supra note 59, at 538-39. Even in fire departments, which have clung stub-
bornly to gender-based classifications, women are assuming more responsibility. Id. at 539.
1 Id. (discussing impact of women on police force).
7- The Supreme Court has accepted that society is changing rapidly and has responded
by striking down numerous gender-based classifications premised on the "old breadwinner-
homemaker" dichotomy. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 178-79 (1982).
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combat, and have repealed their combat exclusion laws.7 4 In con-
trast, while Americans boast that the United States is the most
progressive country in the world in granting freedom and opportu-
nity to its citizens, we continue to uphold laws and policies that
restrict opportunities and whose burdens far outweigh their bene-
fits. An enlightened and progressive society must be flexible
enough to repeal such laws and to prohibit such policies.
CONCLUSION
After years of struggle in the courts, those urging repeal of
combat exclusion laws finally have been acknowledged. Congress
has recognized that the United States cannot maintain military
legislation that violates the Constitution, restricts opportunities,
and detracts from national security. It is hoped that the National
Defense Authorization Act will result in the acceptance of women
71 BECRAFT, PERSIAN GULF, supra note 34, at 2. The author notes the following
developments:
Many other countries, which, like the U.S., have been faced with declining num-
bers of young men eligible for military service during the last decade, have in-
creased the numbers and job opportunities for women. For example:
In January 1990 the British opened seagoing positions on combat ships of the
Royal Navy to women.
Five NATO nations have no combat exclusion laws or policies: Canada, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal. In addition, Greece, the Netherlands, and
Turkey have no statutory restrictions, although they do have selected policies. It-
aly and Spain are the only NATO nations that exclude women from military
service.
Women in Canada and Denmark are trained as fighter pilots. (Ironically, the U.S.
Air Force has trained Danish women fighter pilots but will not train U.S. Air
Force women pilots to fly fighter aircraft.)
Although women in the Israeli armed forces are restricted to noncombatant roles,
Israeli women, like Israeli men, are generally subject to military conscription
(there are some exemptions from compulsory service for women). Women are as-
signed to front-line combat units; if the unit is deployed on a combat mission the
women are evacuated.
Approximately 6,000 women serve in support roles in Japan's Self-Defense Forces.
Id. However, others present America's relative standing in a different light. See Women
Play Increasing Role in Military, 16 MIL. L. REP. 1001, 1022 c.2 (1988).
The American use of women is matched only by Canada, where they are 9% of the
total. Even the commonly believed Israeli experience is largely myth. Women
serve mostly as clerks, drivers, cooks, and the like, functions largely reserved for
them in the pre-1973 U.S. military. They are barred from combat. By contrast, the
Soviet Union, with severe demographic problems and a legal equality that pre-
dates the U.S., has less than 1%, as cooks, clerks, and medical personnel, tradi-
tional jobs in that country.
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into all areas of the armed forces based on their abilities and that
attempts to restrict anyone's career opportunities within the mili-
tary establishment will be enjoined by the courts.
Beverly G. Steinberg
